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Equilibrium and Linear Complementarity--An Economy with 
~nstitutional Constraints on Prices 
Terje Hansen and Alan S. ~annel 
1. Introduction and Summary 
In the theory of perfect competition, it is supposed that 
there are no institutional restrictions upon prices. Much the 
same assumption is built into mathematical programming models. 
The presence of such constraints implies, for example, that 
the market price and the marginal productivity (shadow price) 
of the factors of production will not necessarily coincide. 
Unless such constraints are introduced, models cannot explain 
the simultaneous existence of excess supply of an item and 
yet a positive market price. 
If there is a gap between market and shadow prices, this 
raises a question. By what set of prices are the economic 
agents' actions guided? In this paper, we assume that.one 
sector of the economy, the private sector, is guided by market 
prices. The other, the public sector, is guided by shadow 
prices. 
With conventional optimization techniques, it is awkward. 
--and sometimes inpossible--to handle this type of problem. 
l~esearch supported in part by National Science Founda- 
tion Grant GS-30377 at the Institute for Mathematical Studies 
in the Social Sciences, Stanford University. 
Here we s h a l l  show t h a t  some of  t h e s e  f e a t u r e s  can be i n t r o -  
duced through l i n e a r  complementari ty.  Th i s  approach pe rmi t s  
u s  t o  i n t r o d u c e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  upon p r i ces - - in  ad- 
d i t i o n  t o  t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  a r e  normally 
g e n e r a t e d  through t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  of each  a c t i v i t y  i n  a  l i n -  
e a r  programming model. 
2 .  Compet i t ive  Equ i l ib r ium,  L i n e a r  Complementarity and 
L inea r  Prosrammina 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we review t h e  connec t ion  between competi- 
t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  l i n e a r  complementari ty and l i n e a r  program- 
ming f o r  a  s p e c i a l  case--a " sma l l "  economy t h a t  can se l l  un- 
l i m i t e d  amounts of  i t s  o u t p u t s  upon world markets .  
Consider  such an economy wi th  n  p r o d u c t i v e  p r o c e s s e s .  
The m a t r i x  
d e s c r i b e s  t h e  technology a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  economy. I f  a l l  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  a i j  2 0 (i=l, ..., m ;  j = l ,  ..., n )  , t h e n  t h e s e  denote  
t h e  amount of  i tem i r e q u i r e d  t o  o p e r a t e  a c t i v i t y  j  a t  u n i t  
l e v e  1. 
Let  t h e  column v e c t o r 2  B = (bl,b2,...,b,) I .  Then i f  
B > 0 ,  t h i s  v e c t o r  deno tes  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  
- 
economy. ( I f  a  componenb were n e g a t i v e ,  t h i s  would denote  a  
2 c a p i t a l  l e t t e r s  a r e  used f o r  m a t r i c e s  and vec to r s , and  ' 
deno tes  t r a n s p o s e .  
d e l i v e r y  requirement r a t h e r  than  a  r esource  a v a i l a b l e ) .  
We s h a l l  make t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e  payoff from each 
a c t i v i t y  is determined by world market p r i c e s ,  and t h a t  t h e s e  
a r e  independent of t h e  a c t i v i t y  l e v e l s  i n  t h e  economy. L e t  
C = (c l ,  ..., c n ) l ,  where c  deno tes  t h e  va lue  of ou tpu t  of  j 
a c t i v i t y  j when it is  opera ted  a t  t h e  u n i t  l e v e l .  F i n a l l y ,  
l e t  X = (xl ,  ..., x,)' denote t h e  v e c t o r  of a c t i v i t y  l e v e l s  and 
l e t  Z = (z l ,  ..., 2,)' denote t h e  v e c t o r  o f  i tem p r i c e s .  
A compet i t ive  equ i l ib r ium i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a  nonnega- 
A 
t i v e  v e c t o r  of a c t i v i t y  l e v e l s ,  X ,  and a  nonnegative v e c t o r  of 
A 
p r i c e s ,  2, such t h a t :  
2.1. The product ion plan i s  f e a s i b l e ,  i . e .  
2.2. No a c t i v i t y  makes a  p o s i t i v e  p r o f i t ,  i . e .  
An i tem i n  excess  supply has  a  ze ro  p r i c e ,  i . e .  
2.4. No a c t i v i t y  t h a t  makes a  nega t ive  p r o f i t  is  opera ted  
a t  a  p o s i t i v e  l e v e l ,  i . e .  
Hence the problem of computing a competitive equilibrium 
is equivalent to solving the following linear complementarity 
problem. 
Find vectors (2 ,  2, c ,  k) that satisfy: 
2.6. X'U + Z'W = 0 
where In and Im are identity matrices of order n x n and m x m 
respectively. 
As is well known (see Simonnard [2] ) , relations (2.5. ) - 
(2.7.) are equivalent to solving the linear programming prob- 
lem : 
Maximize C ' X  
subject to A X L B  , 
3 ,  An Equilibrium Problem with Institutional Constraints 
on Market Prices 
In the economy described in the preceding section, there 
were no institutional constraints upon prices. In this sec- 
tion we shall introduce two such types of constraints: 
1) Lower bounds upon individual prices, and 
2) Upper bounds upon individual prices. 
The presence of such constraints implies, for example, 
that the factors of production are not necessarily paid accord- 
ing to their marginal productivity. In the case of a minimum 
price, marginal productivity will coincide with the market 
price only if the marginal productivity of that item exceeds 
or equals the minimum price. The reverse holds for an upper 
bound upon a price. In the subsequent discussion, we shall 
use marginal productivity and shadow price interchangeably. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the relationship between market 
and shadow price in the two cases. 
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I n  s e c t i o n  5 ,  more g e n e r a l  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  on 
p r i c e s  w i l l  be d iscussed.  
Suppose t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  d ivergence between market p r i c e s  
and shadow p r i c e s .  Which of t h e s e  p r i c e s  guide  t h e  a c t i o n s  
of economic agents?  I n  t h i s  paper ,  we assume t h a t  one s e c t o r  
of t h e  economy (which may be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r )  
i s  guided by market p r i c e s .  The o t h e r  ( t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r )  i s  
guided by shadow p r i c e s .  
Suppose t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  nl a c t i v i t i e s  r e f e r  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r ,  whereas t h e  remaining n2 a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  p u b l i c l y  con- 
t r o l l e d .  P a r t i t i c n  X and C s o  t h a t :  
Then X1 and C1 r e f e r  t o  p r i v a t e  a c t i v i t i e s  whereas X2 and C2 
r e f e r  t o  p u b l i c  a c t i v i t i e s .  Let  us  next  suppose t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  a  maximum p r i c e  c o n s t r a i n t  on t h e  f i r s t  ml i t ems ,  whereas 
t h e  remaining m2 i tems have a  minimum p r i c e  c o n s t r a i n t .  The 
l a t t e r  a l s o  inc lude  those  i tems where t h e  only  p r i c e  c o n s t r a i n t  
i s  nonnega t iv i ty .  P a r t i t i o n  t h e  mat r ix  A 
where All i s  m x nl, A12 i s  m x n 2 ,  A21 is  m2 x nl1 and A22  
The vec to r  Z = (z  l , . . . , ~ m ) '  w i l l  r e f e r  t o  shadow p r i c e s ,  
whereas t h e  v e c t o r  Y = ( y l , . . . l y m ) '  w i l l  r e f e r  t o  m a r k e t p r i c e s .  
P a r t i t i o n  Z and Y 
such t h a t  Z1 and Y1 r e f e r  t o  f a c t o r s  wi th  a  maximum p r i c e  
c o n s t r a i n t  and Z 2  and Y2 r e f e r  t o  i tems wi th  a  minimum p r i c e  
c o n s t r a i n t .  Let  t h e  known nonnegative v e c t o r s  Q1 and Q2 denote 
maximum and minimum p r i c e s  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  i . e .  
and 
A price-constrained equilibrium, if it exists, is charac- 
A A 
terized by a vector of activity levels, X, market prices, Y, 
A 
and shadow prices Z such that: 
3.1. The production plan is feasible, i.e. 
3.2. No activity makes a positive profit, i.e. 
3.3. The market prices satisfy the institutional constraints, 
3.4. There is a nonnegative wedge between market and shadow 
3 . 5 .  If a factor is in excess supply, it has a zero shadow 
price, i.e. 
3 . 6 .  If an activity makes a negative profit, it is operated 
at a zero level, i.e. 
A A 
X'U = 0 . 
3 . 7 .  The shadow price equals the market price if the insti- 
tutional constraint is not binding, i.e. 
Let us substitute from (3.1) into ( 3 . 2 . 1 . )  and ( 3 . 4 . ) .  
We then get: 
Hence the problem of computing an equilibrium is equivalent 
to solving the following linear complementarity problem. 
- 10- 
F i n d  v e c t o r s  ( 2 ,  2 ,  9 ,  G, k, 9)  t h a t  s a t i , s f y : 3  
3 . 9 .  X ' U  + Z ' W  + V'T = 0 , 
where  I ( s=n l rn2 ,ml rm2)  i s  an i d e n t i t y  m a t r i x  o f  o r d e r  
S 
S X S. 
The above problem C(3.8.) - ( 3 .  10. ) ]  d o e s  n o t  c o r r e s p o n d  
t o  a  l i n e a r  program f o r  h e r e  t h e r e  a r e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  
upon p r i c e s .  Hence, an  e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  may n o t  b e  ob- 
3 ~ h e  n o n n e g a t i v i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s  G1 = Q1 - el i 0 a n d  
q 2  = Q2 + c2 a r e  d r o p p e d  b e c a u s e  t h e y  w i l l  b e  s a t i s f i e d  by 
a n y  s o l u t i o n  t o  ( 3 . 8 . )  - ( 3 . 1 0 . ) .  
tained by solving this as a linear programming problem. More- 
over, there is no a priori reason why a solution (3.8.) - (3.10.) 
need be unique or even exist at all. This makes it worthwhile 
to devise an algorithm that generates multiple equilibrium so- 
lutions. 
Hansen and Mathiesen [I] have developed and tested an 
algorithm that generates multiple complementary solutions to 
the problem: 
where M is a matrix of order R x R ,  IR is an identity matrix of 
order L x L  and S, R and D are column vectors with R  components. 
No specific assumptions are made on the matrix M. The algo- 
rithm is not guaranteed to generate all complementary solu- 
tions to (3.11. ) - (3.13. ) . 1n fifty-six small scale experiments, 
however, the algorithm generated all complementary solutions 
in all but one experiment. This algorithm may be applied to 
solve (3.8.) - (3.10.), each complmentary solution representing 
a different equilibrium. 
It may be instructive to give an interpretation of the 
character of the equilibrium solution. Suppose we decompose 
the resource availability vector B so that 
is made available to the private sector, and the remaining 
is made available to the public sector. Suppose that each 
sector maximizes the value of its output, i.e. we solve the 
linear programming problems: 
3.14. Maximize c i  x1 I 
subject to 
Maximize Ci X2 
subject to 
w i t h  a s s o c i a t e d  p r i c e  v e c t o r  ?, w i l l  t h e n  be a  s o l u t i o n  t o  1 
A A 
(3 .14 . )  whereas X 2  w i t h  a s s o c i a t e d  p r i c e  v e c t o r  2, w i l l  be a  
s o l u t i o n  t o  (3 .15 . ) .  
4 .  A Numerical Example 
The fo l lowing  numer ica l  example may be  i l l u s t r a t i v e  o f  
t h e  p reced ing  d i s c u s s i o n .  We have an  economy w i t h  f o u r  a c t i -  
v i t i e s  and t h r e e  r e s o u r c e s .  Moreover, 
n  = 2 (number o f  p r i v a t e  a c t i v i t i e s ) ,  1 
"2 = 2 (number o f  p u b l i c  a c t i v i t i e s ) ,  
ml = 1 (number o f  i t e m s  w i t h  a  maximum p r i c e ,  e . g .  
a  c e i l i n g  on c a p i t a l  c h a r g e s ) ,  
m2 = 2 (number o f  i t ems  w i t h  a  minimum p r i c e ,  e . g .  
a  f l o o r  on wages o r  a  " r e s e r v a t i o n  wage" ) .  
Q1 = .1 (maximum p r i c e )  
Q~ = [z:] (minimum p r i c e )  . 
W e  have 
Then an  e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  i s  o b t a i n e d  by s o l v i n g  t h e  fo l low-  
A n n _  
i n g  l i n e a r  complementar i ty  problem: F ind  v e c t o r s  ( X I  Z ,  V ,  U ,  
G I  !?) t h a t  s a t i s f y :  
I n  ( 4 . 1 . )  - ( 4 . 3 . )  have t h e  unique  s o l u t i o n  
Moreover 
I f  t h e r e  were no i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  upon p r i c e s ,  
equ i l ib r ium a c t i v i t y  l e v e l s  and p r i c e s  would be given by 
Moreover we would have 
. =. [la] 
and c ' ?  = 78.  
For i l l u s t r a t i v e  purposes suppose t h a t  t h e  f i r s t ,  second 
and t h i r d  resource  a r e  c a p i t a l ,  l a b o r  and land r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
W e  may t h e n  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  a  c e i l i n g  o n  cap-  
i t a l  c h a r g e s  and  a  f l o o r  o n  wages  h a v e  l e d  t o  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  economy ' s  o u t p u t  a s  w e l l  a s  a  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n c r e a s e  i n  unemployment.  Moreover  l a n d  h a s  be-  
come a  s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e .  The example  i l l u s t r a t e s  how m o d e l s  
o f  t h i s  k i n d  may b e  u s e d  t o  s t u d y  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  i n s t i -  
t u t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  on m a r k e t  p r i c e s .  
5.  G e n e r a l  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o n s t r a i n t s  o n  M a r k e t  P r i c e s  
Suppose  t h a t  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  maxi-mum a n d  minimum con-  
s t r a i n t s ,  t h e r e  a r e  p  l i n e a r  c o n s t r a i n t s  o n  m a r k e t  p r i c e s  
g i v e n  b y  
An example  w i l l .  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e s e  c o n s t r a i n t s .  
Suppose  f a c t o r  1 i s  s k i l l e d  l a b o r  a n d  f a c t o r  2 i s  u n s k i l l e d  
l a b o r ,  and  t h e  two f i r s t  c o n s t r a i n t s  a r e :  
T h e s e  two  c o n s t r a i n t s  t o g e t h e r  i m p l y  t h a t  t h e  wages  o f  s k i l l e d  
l a b o r  s h a l l  b e  a t  leas t  a s  g r e a t  a s  t h e  wages  o f  u n s k i l l e d  
l a b o r ,  b u t  s h a l l  n o t  e x c e e d  t h e  wages  o f  u n s k i l l e d  l a b o r  by  
more than 20%. Constraints of this type may arise for several 
reasons. They may, for example, arise from the need for fair- 
ness as perceived within trade unions. 
Let us partition the matrix F such that the first ml col- 
umns refer to items with a maximum price constraint and the 
remaining m2 to those with a minimum price constraint, i.e. 
Wethen have: 
An equilibrium, if it exists, is therefore characterized by 
a vector of activity levels 2 ,  market prices ?, and shadow 
A 
prices Z, such that (3.1.) - (3.7.) and (5.2.) are satisfied. 
Substitute from (3.3.) into (5.2.). 
In order to simplify notation, let us rewrite (3.8.) in the 
following compact form: 
L e t  us  i n t r o d u c e  a v e c t o r  of  p  dummy v a r i a b l e s ,  
E = ( e l ,  ..., e  ) I .  The problem of computing an  e q u i l i b r i u m  
P  
i s  t h e n  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  s o l v i n g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  l i n e a r  complemen- 
t a r i t y  problem. 
F ind  v e c t o r s  ( i ,  2 ,  $, 6 ,  6, i ,  ?, & )  t h a t  s a t i s f y :  
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  e q u i l i b r i u m  given i n  s e c t i o n  t h r e e  
a l s o  a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  r e p r e s e n t e d  by (5 .4 . )  - 
( 5 . 6 . ) .  Again t h e  Hansen-Mathiesen a l g o r i t h m  may be a p p l i e d  
t o  o b t a i n  numer ica l  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h i s  problem. 
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